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Sex Quotas and Burkini Bans
Darren Rosenblum*
This Essay recounts how feminist theorists and activists managed to write their ideals
into the fabric of French law and culture, and how nonfeminists began to appropriate those
ideals. Paritd, the 2000 law that requires halfofall candidates for public ofice be women, saw
French feminists first engineer a change in French universalism to respect sex diference;
although not wholly successful, Pariti advanced women's political inclusion. Then, like a drop
of water in a pond, these feminist ideas disappeared in plain sight: they became intrinsic to
French state norms and public values. As they became woven into such norms, however
politicians began to use them to promote exclusions: first excluding Muslims from full
participation in the Republic with veil and burqa bans, then supporting exclusions of sex and
class with a corporate board quota (CBQ). Most recently, feminist ideas have been called
upon to exclude French Muslims with proposed burkini bans.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay recounts how feminist theorists and activists
managed to write their ideals into the fabric of French law and culture,
and how nonfeminists began to appropriate those ideals to advance
exclusions of Muslims.
The 1789 D&laration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen
(Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen) defines all
* © 2017 Darren Rosenblum. Professor at the Haub Law School at Pace
University. The author wishes to thank Janet Halley and Rachel Rebouch6, as well as Laure
Bereni, Stephanie Hennette Vauchez, and Julie Saada. Crucial research support was
provided by Briana Costa, Kristyn Francese, and J6r6me Orihac.
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citizens as equal under the law. Soon after the bicentennial of the
Ddclaration des droits de l'homme in 1989, feminists began an
organized push to improve women's political representation through a
quota.' In 2000, France adopted Paritd, a law that requires that half of
all candidates for public office be women.2 For Pariti to succeed, it
had to account for the values of universalisme, which bars quotas that
differentiate among citizens.3 Feminists argued that since this
universel was dual-male and female-Parit would justly give
women half of the power of the body politic. Parit's passage
transformed feminist interest in sex difference and women's equality
into a core valeur rdpublicaine.
Then, like a drop of water in a pond, these feminist ideas
disappeared in plain sight: they became intrinsic to French state
norms and public values. As they became woven into state norms,
however, politicians began to use them to promote exclusions. The
feminism of Pariti flipped from including women to excluding
French citizens who were not franco-frangais.4 Protecting women
became a goal, justifying the Republic's chivalrous, even paternalistic,
response to Muslim customs. French leaders embraced feminism as a
way to defend the country against Islamic fundamentalism with bans
on veils in public schools in 2004 and burqas in 2011.5 Immediately
1. FRANcOISE GASPARD ET AL., Au PouvoIR, cIrOYENNES! LIBERTt, tGALITA,
PARrrt 20-40 (1992). Under the universalist doctrine, all should be treated equally, without
regard to membership in a particular group. All citizens universally benefit from this equal
level of treatment. See DECLARATION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DU CITOYEN DE 1789
[DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN OF 1789] art. VI (Fr.).
2. Loi 2000-493 du 6 juin 2000 tendant A favoriser l'6gal acc6s des femmes et des
hommes aux mandats 6lectoraux et fonctions 6lectives [Law 2000-493 of June 6, 2000 to
promote equal access of women and men to electoral mandates and elective functions],
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRA(AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June
7, 2000, p. 8560.
3. See, e.g., Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 82-
146DC, Nov. 18, 1982, J.O. 3475 (noting that two of France's founding principles-article 3
of the Constitution of 1958 and article 6 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
the Citizen-oppose the categorization and division of citizens).
4. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, France Enforces Ban on Full-Face Veils in Public,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/world/europe/12ftance.
html (discussing France's ban of veils in public places and how proponents of the law rely on
the preservation of French culture and "the liberty and equality of women" for support).
5. Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans
l'espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 prohibiting the concealment of the face
in the public space], J.O., Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18,344 (passed in 2010 and effective in 2011);
Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laicit6, le port de
signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les 6coles, collges et
lyc6es publics [Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004 concerning, as an application of the
[Vol. 92:469470
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after he engineered the 2011 burqa ban, conservative leader Jean-
Frangois Cop6 and his colleague Marie-Jo Zimmermann led the push
for a corporate board quota.6 With passage and implementation of the
CBQ, feminism made a complete transformation, from marginal
leftist theory to elite conservative discourse. Conservative Cop6
exploited feminist justifications for advancing women's corporate
equality while true Parit feminists remained uninvolved.7
Most recently, feminist ideas have been called upon to exclude
French Muslims with proposed burkini bans. From 2014 to 2016,
feminist rhetoric resurfaced again as municipalities across southern
France banned the "burkini," a modest, full-coverage bathing suit8
Particularly after the 2016 Bastille Day terrorist attack,9 debate over
how women dress themselves became a central component of the
French state's response to terrorism. The Conseil d'Itat struck down
burkini bans;o nevertheless, feminist arguments that promoted those
bans helped further nationalist depictions of the Republic.
Through its four parts-respectively on Parit6, the veil/burqa
bans, the CBQ, and burkini bans-this Essay will show that the
feminist push for women's inclusion came to play a role in deepening
religious exclusions.
II. PARITA: FEMIMSM ENTERS THE STATE
In the late nineteenth century, Hubertine Auclert, a French
suffragist, wrote that women should have half the seats in the
principle of the separation of church and state, the wearing of symbols or garb that show
religious affiliation in public primary and secondary schools], J.O., Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190.
6. Quotas for women epitomize how feminism has come to exercise influence over
states, and nowhere is this truer than in France. After Pariti mandated equal numbers of
female and male political candidates, the CBQ required sex diversity in boardrooms. Here,
conservatives became content to deploy feminist arguments to force women's inclusion into
the corporate board context.
7. Cop6 was depicted as an opportunist by a political opponent during the debates
on the CBQ. Margaux Collet, Danielle Bousquet: "Des forces conservatrices bloquent les
avanc&s des droits des femmes," LIBERATION (Mar. 8, 2010, 6:29 PM), http://www.
liberation.fr/societe/2010/03/08/danielle-bousquet-des-forces-conservatrices-bloquent-les-
avancees-des-droits-des-femmes_613990.
8. Amanda Taub, France's 'Burkini' Bans Are About More Than Religion or
Clothing, N.Y. TiMEs (Aug. 18, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2bLJXHp.
9. Alissa J. Rubin et al., Scores Die in Nice, France, as Truck Plows into Bastille
Day Crowd, N.Y. TtES (July 14,2016), https://nyti.ms/2a22JY7.
10. Conseil d'ttat [CE] [Council of State], Aug. 26, 2016, 402742. The Council of
State acts as a supreme court of administrative justice, which reviews laws. CONSEIL D'ETAT,
http://english.conseil-etat.fr/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
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Assembly.1 Nearly a century later, France experienced a powerful
women's movement in the 1960s, much like the one happening in the
concurrent second wave of feminism in the United States. In 1980,
the first proposed sex quota included 20% of candidates in elections
in towns of more than 2500.12 A subsequent 25% version was passed
by the National Assembly, but the Constitutional Council rejected it in
1982 as violating the indivisibility of the sovereign nation, an idea
linked to universalism.13 Universalism had blocked the first effort.14
Enshrined in the 1789 Dclaration des droits de l'homme et du
citoyen, universalism-a radical eighteenth century Enlightenment
response to monarchy-meant that the state would consider each
citizen as completely equal. 5
In the 1990s, feminists reimagined the quota as Parit6 to survive
consideration by the Constitutional Council. 16 This new approach
required that half of all political candidates be women, although the
legislature reserved no seats for women. 7 Women were half of
humanity (1'homme in the sense of humankind) and so needed to be
particularly included in the universal. The universal remained
unchanged: it was still the ideal, now including rather than excluding
women. Parit in this sense did not constitute minority
representation, which would be impermissible under universalism.
This dual universal became a public norm that even opponents had to
embrace, in word if not by deed.18
11. HUBERTINEAUCLERT, LA CITOYENNE: ARTICLES DE 1881 A 1891, at 52 (1982).
12. GIL ALLWOOD & KHURSHEED WADIA, WOMEN AND POLITICS IN FRANCE 1958-
2000, at 192 (2000). For an in-depth exploration of Paritg, see tLEONORE LEPINARD,
LEGALITE INTROUVABLE: LA PARITE, LES FEMINISTES ET LA REPUBLIQUE (2007).
13. CC No. 82-146DC, Nov. 18, 1982, J.O. 3475. The Conseil based its decision on
article 3 of the 1958 Constitution and article 6 of the 1789 Declaration. Id. One member of
the Conseil noted that "a text that reserved a certain proportion of places for women ...
without doing the same for men ... would be contrary to the principle of equality." Georges
Vedel, Les 20% de femmes et la Constitution, LE MONDE (Mar. 2, 1979), http://www.
lemonde.fr/archives/article/1979/02/03/les-20-de-femmes-et-la-constitution27902601819
218.html (author's translation).
14. ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 12, at 206-07,211.
15. William Bristow, Enlightenment, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
21-23 (Edward N. Zalta et al. eds., 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/falI2017/entries/
enlightenment/; see also CLAUDE DU GRANRUT, ALLEZ LES FEMMES! LA PARITt EN POLITIQUE
34 (2002); GASPARD ET AL., supra note 1, at 51 (providing an example of how, when
universalist ideals are upheld, groups such as women dramatically increase their position and
presence in areas and activities from which they were previously shunned).
16. GRANRUT, supra note 15, at 30-32.
17. ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 12, at 206-07.
18. Conservative President Jacques Chirac expressed support for parity, but his
center-right coalition ran less than 20% female candidates during the elections of 2002. See
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Feminists made a concerted political effort to enact Pariti as
law.19 Their deft strategizing targeted both the French intelligentsia
and popular opinion. To skirt the anti-quota taboo in France,
Frangoise Gaspard-a former Socialist member of the National
Assembly, its first openly lesbian member, and an intellectual and
political leader of the Paritd movement-argued that since women
were not a minority, Pariti was not a quota: "distingue du quota par sa
philosophie mdme."20 The 85% male legislature agreed. Across party
lines, it revised the Constitution in 1999 and passed the law in 2000,
ensuring "equal access of women and men to electoral office and
elected functions."21
Paritd did not realize advocates' dreams of a rapid increase in
women's representation-women currently only constitute 38.6% of
the National Assembly-but it did institutionalize the feminist goal of
women's equality elsewhere in the state and guarantee their place at
the table.22 Through Parit, feminism became a central yet adaptable
Garance Franke-Ruta, Liberte, Egalit6, Sororitd, LEGAL AFF. (Jan.-Feb. 2003), http://www.
legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2003/featureruta janfeb203.sp.
19. See Laure Bereni et al., Entre contrainte et ressource: les mouvementsfiministes
face au droit, 29 NOUVELLES QUESTIONS FEMINISTES 6-7 (2010).
20. GASPARD ET AL., supra note 1, at 165; see also JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, PARITE!
SExuAL EQUALITY AND THE CRISIS OF FRENCH UNIVERSALISM (2005) (describing Partd as a
universalist theory).
21. Loi 99-569 du 8 juillet 1999 relative A l'6galit6 entre les femmes et les hornmes
[Law 99-569 of July 8, 1999 on equality between women and men], J.O., July 9, 1999,
p. 10,175. Enforcement mechanisms varied depending on the type of election. France's semi-
proportional system includes municipal, regional, European, and some senatorial elections
that follow party lists, while others, notably National Assembly elections, require voters to
select a particular candidate. Id.; see generally LaPINARD, supra note 12 (discussing how
Paritd incentivizes equality of opportunity but not equality of results between men and
women in politics). In list elections, prefectures would refuse to present nonconforming lists
on the ballot. For executive posts and National Assembly seats, a party's candidates overall
must be half women and half men, and noncompliant parties accordingly lose funding. Loi
2000-493 du 6 juin 2000 tendant d favoriser l'6gal acc~s des femmes et des hommes aux
mandats 61ectoraux et fonctions 6lectives [Law 2000493 of June 6, 2000 to promote equal
access of women and men to electoral mandates and elective functions], JOURNAL OFFICIEL
DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAcAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 7, 2000, art. XV
22. Jemima Kelly, France Elects Record Number of Women to Parliament, REUTERS
(June 18, 2017, 5:05 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-women/france-
elects-record-number-of-women-to-parliament-idUSKBN19911E. Any continued exclusion
of women's issues would be countered by the Observatoire de la parit6 and the D lgation de
l'Assemblde Nationale, two governmental bodies that include several members of feminist
associative networks, giving them the opportunity to be heard by the legislators. Laure
Bereni, Quand la mise a l'agenda ravive les mobilisations fiministes. L'espace de la cause
desfemmes et la parite politique (1997-2000), 59 REVUE FRANQAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE
301, 315-16 (2009).
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norm of the French state,23 a norm open to racialized utilization.24
Across party lines, leaders would soon find other uses for feminism's
moral and political legitimacy.
III. How FEMINISM EXCLUDES: THE VEIL AND BURQA BANS
Feminism, now an integral part of the state, came to play an
exclusionary role with regard to Muslims, specifically Muslim
women's bodies, first by restricting the veil in public schools, then by
banning burqas in public places.25 In 1989, that same bicentennial
year that proved important for feminists, a public school in Creil
expelled three girls for refusing to take off their headscarves. 26 SOS
Racisme, France's most prominent anti-racism group, responded by
arguing that veils should be allowed in public schools.27 Gisble
23. Laure Bereni et al., supra note 19, at 11-12. As Laure Bereni argues, Parit6 saw
"State feminism" take a central role in the French state. She notes that the mobilization of the
movement during the 1990s permitted Paritd's claim to become part of the political agenda,
and, in turn, the governmental and parliamentary instances of State feminism played an
essential role in the consolidation of the reform. See Bereni, supra note 22, at 305-10, 314-
21. Parite influenced the definition of the politics of State feminism, contributing to re-
situate at the highest level of politics, all while furnishing a new grammar for the promotion
of women's place in the professional sphere. Bereni, supra note 22, at 305-10, 314-21.
24. Etienne Balibar suggested this phenomenon: "there is a 'racist' utilization of
feminism as there is a 'sexist' utilization of anti-racism." tTIENNE BALIBAR, DES
UNIVERSELS: ESSAIS ET CONFtRENCES 22 (2016).
25. Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans
l'espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 prohibiting the concealment of the face
in the public space], J.O., Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18,344 (banning face coverings in public places);
Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laicit6, le port de
signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les 6coles, coll6ges et
lyckes publics [Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004 concerning, as an application of the
principle of the separation of church and state, the wearing of symbols or garb that show
religious affiliation in public primary and secondary schools], J.O., Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190
(banning religious symbols in public schools); see also RtGIs DEBRAY, CE QUE NOUS VOILE
LE VOiLE: LA RPUBLIQUE ET LE SACRA (2004) (commenting on Law 2004-228). The law
only requires for large religious symbols to be banned from schools, but persons can still feel
free to wear religious symbols in all other public places. Students may also continue to
express their views through writings and free speech while at school. Id. at 22. However
lofty the goals of French universalism, and of Parit6 in including women, minority women's
identities are erased by this universalism that recognizes gender but ignores race. Minority
women, as a consequence, may only find their political voice as culturally neutral (read
"French") women, their racial and ethnic identity rendered invisible.
26. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Arab Girls' Veils at Issue in France, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 12,
1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/12/world/arab-girls-veils-at-issue-in-france.html.
27. Id.
474
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Halimi, soon to be a vocal Pariti advocate, responded by quitting the
group on television.28
Efforts to ban Islamic veils in public schools gathered steam
after the U.S. terrorist attacks in 2001. Parite's passage made women
more visible, including female Muslims. This visibility brought wider
attention to their attire, the modesty of which was not culturally
French (franco-frangais).29 Public schools provided the perfect site
for regulation. There, "the students are not users like others, but
minors in full learning of citizenship who attend a 'privileged site of
the acquisition and learning of our common values, [and] an excellent
instrument to ground the republican idea."'30
Muslim women aroused a paternalist instinct in the still largely
male political leadership: to protect women and girls from their men,
their religion, and its "archaic" practices, leaders interpreted France's
republican values, its valeurs rdpublicaines, to exclude Muslim
women's dress.31
Secularism has held powerful sway in the French Republic since
the anti-clerical fervor of the French Revolution stripped the French
state of Catholicism and even denuded many cathedrals of their
religious statuary.32 Enacted in the early twentieth century, the Laicit6
statute established France as a strictly nonreligious republic and
reflected the norms of gender exclusion.33 France's policy actually
28. In 1989, Halimi supported the "dignity of woman," arguing that "the veil is a sign
of submission" and an attack on laicite. Gisile Halimi sur le port du voile 4 l 'cole (France 3
television broadcast Nov. 2, 1989), http://fresques.ina.fr/elles-centrepompidou/fiche-media/
ArtFemOO115/gisele-halimi-sur-le-port-du-voile-a-l-ecole.html; see also Anne Chemin,
Burkini: au nom de quoi peut-on limiter la liberti vestimentaire des femmes?, LE MONDE
(Sept. 1, 2016, 12:34 PM), http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/09/01/le-burkini-une-
question-de-principes_4991040_3232.html (quoting the French argument before the
European Court of Human Rights in the case challenging the veil ban).
29. Franco-frangais means not just French but francocentric. See Definition of
franco-frangais, REVERSO DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.reverso.net/french-definition/franco-
fran%C3%A7ais (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
30. Chemin, supra note 28.
31. See, e.g., Europe 1, Laurence Rossignol dinonce le burkini, '"rofondiment
archafque, " YOUTUBE (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tpC6YYzMaow.
32. John McManners, The Revolution and Its Antecedents, in FRANCE: GOVERNMENT
AND SOCIETY 161 (J.M. Wallace-Hadrill & John McManners eds., 1970); JONATHAN
LAURENCE, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, U.S.-FRANCE ANALYSIS SERIES: THE NEW FRENCH
MINORITY POLITICS 1 (2003), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
laurence.pdf.
33. The law that established laicitd was Loi du 9 d6cembre 1905 concernant la
s6paration des Eglises et de l'Etat. The veil ban shifted the interpretation of laicit6 from
barring institutional recognition to bar individual expression as well. Chemin, supra note 28
(quoting Stephanie Hennette Vauchez). For an expert study of the transformation of laicit6 in
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bars any official recordkeeping of racial and ethnic data and generally
resists any "positive" or affirmative action to integrate Muslim
immigrants.34 Even so, France's diversity is not new: prior to the
twentieth century, many Protestants and Jews considered themselves
French citizens. After the Vichy collaboration of World War II and the
various colonies' independence movements, France became a defacto
multicultural society due to mass labor immigration from its colonies,
especially those of North Africa.35 Unlike nominally Catholic but
often-atheist franco-frangais people,36 Muslims tend to be more
devout. They constitute France's second-largest religious and primary
ethnic minority.37 This minority faces exclusion: "Narrowly linked to
the exclusionary and racial conception of citizenship, la'citd did not
respect its claimed trait of universalism." 38
Feminists who fought for Pariti in the 1990s surely could not
have anticipated France's increasing Islamophobia in the post-9/11
context. Several prominent feminists such as Elisabeth Badinter and
Gisble Halimi, along with groups such as Ni Putes Ni Soumises, acted
to promote the headscarf law's exclusions as an advance in women's
emancipation.39 Veil-ban supporters used feminist arguments to assert
the twenty-first century, see STtPHANIE HENNETTE VAUCHEZ & VINCENT VALENTIN,
L'AFFAIRE DU BABY Loup OU LA NOUVELLE LAtCrrt (2014). Based on laicit, France even
barred the collection of any data about race or ethnicity, due to past abuses in collecting
ethnic data by government officials. T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laicit6: A
Comparison of the United States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419, 428 (2004); Michel
Troper, French Secularism, or Laicit6, 21 CARDozo L. REv. 1267, 1267 (2000); Jonathan
Laurence, Islam in France, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Dec. 1, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/
articles/islam-in-france/; Laurence, supra note 32, at 2. France's laicit6 historically followed
a norm that excluded sex equality. Florence Rochefort, Ambivalences laiques et critiques
fiministes, in LE POUVOIRDU GENRE: LAICIrES ET RELIGIONS 1905-2005, at 65 (2007).
34. LAURENCE, supra note 32, at 2.
35. Id. at 1-2.
36. See Sylvie Kauffmann, Opinion, God Is Back-in France, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26,
2017), https://nyti.ms/2kw8ei0 (citing polls finding that while 55% of French citizens
identify as Catholic, only 5% to 8% go to church regularly).
37. JONATHAN LAURENCE & JUSTIN VAISSE, INTEGRATING ISLAM: POLITICAL AND
RELIGIOUS CHALLENGES IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE 15 (2006). However, estimates of
minority and religious groups in France vary widely because the state is prohibited from
collecting data on individuals' religious beliefs or ethnicity. Id. at 17-20.
38. Florence Rochefort, Introduction to LE POUVOIR DU GENRE: LATCITES ET
RELIGIONS 1905-2005, at 9, 20 (2007) (author's translation) (italics added).
39. Frangoise Gaspard, Le Foulard de la Dispute, 1 CAHIERS Du GENRE (HORS-SERIE)
75, 86-87 (2006). Supporters of the veil ban include Gisble Halimi, tlisabeth Badinter, the
group Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Sluts nor Submissives), and the weekly magazine, Elle.
Id. at 87; see also MAYANThI L. FERNANDO, THE REPUBLIC UNSETTLED: MUSLIM FRENCH
AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF SECULARISM 175-78 (2014) (discussing Halimi and others'
arguments for supporting the ban).
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that the state should protect Muslim women and girls from their
religion and from their men. The same universalism that Parit had
adapted to include women now functioned here to exclude others,
notably due to ethnic and religious differences.40 One veil ban
advocate went so far as to warn that veil-wearing would invite the
installation of an Islamic state in France.41
Notably, Frangoise Gaspard, who had crafted and executed the
Parit idea, opposed the veil ban, stating that the ban would only
encourage its use. 4 2 For her, the duality of the French republic with
regard to sex still invited a pluralist recognition of other differences,
rather than exclusion of minorities.43 Indeed, she referred to the pro-
ban feminism as having a "caractere liberticide."44
Advocates were mindful of the need to present the ban as neutral
lest it be considered a relic of France's colonialism. The law
encompassed more religious symbols-large crosses and
yarmulkes-although none were as prevalent as the veil.45 Such
denials of "exception" only proved the contrary--everyone knew that
the law's intent was to control the wearing of the veil.
In 2004, the National Assembly passed the ban, with an
exception for small symbols.46 The Conseil d'ttat ratified the law.
While the wearing of large religious items in public schools did not
necessarily violate laicitd, the items might "constitute an act of
40. Joan Scott linked French feminist adaptation of universalism with anti-immigrant
sentiment. Joan Wallach Scott, French Universalism in the Nineties, 15 DIFFERENCES 32, 37-
40 (2004).
41. Catherine Coroller, Voile, I'heure des timoins, LIBERATION (Nov. 19, 2003, 1:57
AM), http://liberation.fr/grand-angle/2003/11/19/voile-1-heure-des-temoines_45237 (quoting
Fadela Amara, President of Ni Putes Ni Soumises).
42. FRANQOISE GASPARD & FARHAD KHOSROKHAVAR, LE FOULARD ET LA REPUBLIQUE
55 (1995).
43. Darren Rosenblum, Parity/Disparity: Electoral Gender Inequality on the
Tightrope ofLiberal Constitutional Traditions, 39 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1119, 1162-63 (2006).
44. The feminism she described had a liberty-killing trait. Gaspard, supra note 39, at
87.
45. Elisabeth Roudinesco, Le foulard i l'd&ole, touffoir de l'altirit6, LIBERATION
(May 27, 2003, 11:09 PM), http://www.liberation.fr/tribune/2003/05/27/le-foulard-a-l-ecole-
etouffoir-de-l-alterite_434944.
46. Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laicit6, le
port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les 6coles, coll6ges
et lyc~es publics [Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004 concerning, as an application of the
principle of the separation of church and state, the wearing of symbols or garb that show
religious affiliation in public primary and secondary schools], J.O., Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190;
see also DEBRAY, supra note 25, at 22 (contending that a ban on burqas is not an interdiction
on the practice of Islam, but a preservation of secularism and respect for the public by
limiting the penetration of such large religious symbols to political life).
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pressure, provocation, proselytism, or propaganda" toward other
students or the school.47 The veil ban transformed laiciti from
established neutrality toward an aggressive exclusion of overt
religious expression.4 8 This nouvelle laicite, as St6phanie Hennette
Vauchez calls it, "limits not only the action of the state but also the
liberty of individuals." 49 With this change, laicitd went from a right to
freedom from religious inequality to a duty to restrict. In feminist
terms, Gaspard's pluralist feminism lost while Halimi's liberticide
feminism won. Nonfeminist leaders took notice.
In 2009, National Assembly member Jean-Frangois Cop6 began
an effort to ban burqas. Burqas were "[une] bless[ure] pour la dignit6
de la femme," an injury to the dignity of woman as an ideal, not "des
femmes"-of women as a group.50 France needed protection, Cop6
argued, from people who were "instrumentalizing religion" to
disregard French fraternit, in which one's face forms a civic
presence.51
Feminist framings of the burqa debate proved useful for
nonfeminists. Then-President Nicolas Sarkozy's support persuaded
some. He stated that
The issue with the burqa is not a religious one. It is an issue of the
liberty and dignity of woman. The burqa is a sign of enslavement; it is
a sign of abasement .... We cannot accept in our country that women
would be prisoners behind a gate, cut from all social life, deprived of all
identity. It is not the idea that we have of the dignity of woman.52
While Sarkozy focused on the dignity of women, Cop6 situated
women as part of an idealized heteronormative life: "A trait of our
civilization, one of the French singularities, is the exaltation of the art
47. Elisa T. Beller, The HeadscarfAffair: The Conseil d'Atat on the Role ofReligion
and Culture in French Society, 39 TEx. INT'L L.J. 581, 611 (2004). Although arguments were
made that this law violates individual religious freedom, the National Assembly determined
that banning large religious symbols in public schools fostered the educational purpose of the
school by promoting equality instead of religious division. Guy Coq, Port du voile: un statu
quo inacceptable, LE FIGARO, Nov. 1, 2003, at 10.
48. See supra text accompanying note 33.
49. VAUCHEZ & VALENTIN, supra note 33, at 29-30.
50. Jean-Frangois Cop6, La burqa n'estpas une exigence coranique, SLATE (Fr.) (July
4, 2009), http://www.slate.fr/story/7621/burqa-cop6 (author's translation).
51. Jean-Frangois Cop6, Opinion, Tearing Away the Veil, N.Y TIMES (May 4, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/opinion/05cope.html.
52. Stephanie Le Bars, Pour Nicolas Sarkozy, "ce n'est pas un probldme religieux,"
LE MONDE (June 23, 2009, 2:20 PM), http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2009/06/23/pour-
nicolas-sarkozy-ce-n-est-pas-un-probleme-religieux_1210262_3224.html (author's translation).
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of living together, men and women."53 This vivre ensemble between
men and women constituted "an inheritance of history, a trait of our
identity."4 Cop6, therefore, framed burqas as "walls of fabric" that
upend the vivre ensemble of men and women.55 Cop6 insisted that
women's faces must be exposed as part of their role in the vivre
ensemble with men.56 The heteronormativity of this vivre ensemble, if
unintended by Cop6, remains evident-it points to people relating
across sexes, in what some might describe as a sexual market. The
strong modesty of burqas violates this French ideal of the sexual
nature of women's (as well as men's) visible faces and bodies. Actual
feminists-like Halimi and many others-proved secondary in the
law's realization, even as they legitimized the opportunistic feminism
of these prominent hommes politiques.57
Even so, the implicit heteronormativity of Cop6's vivre ensemble
argument did not spring fully formed from his imagination. It recalls
an entire strain of French feminism that emphasized heterosexuality,
femininity, and how the erotics of sexual difference gave women
power in society.58 Other feminists, such as historian Mona Ouzouf
and philosopher Elisabeth Badinter, focused on the doux commerce
(passionate economy) between the sexes as a basis for feminism, a
basis to oppose Pariti as overly driven by equality in a way that
submerged difference. "Muslims did not understand that open erotic
play was integral to Frenchness;" therefore, these feminists questioned
the inclusion of Muslim culture within the Republic.59 For example,
in an essay on chivalry, feminist Claude Habib insisted on French
seduction as a bulwark against Islamism.60
Cop6 did not just allude to feminist theory-he explicitly
included a nonbinding resolution in favor of respect for women's
53. Cop6, supra note 50.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Voile intigral: Gisile Halimi pour une approche "gradu&," LE PoINT (Sept. 29,
2009, 7:09 PM), http://www.lepoint.fr/actualites-societe/2009-09-29/voile-integral-gisele-
halimi-pour-une-approche-graduee/920/0/381452.
58. Joan Wallach Scott, Opinion, Feminism? A Foreign Import, N.Y TIMES (May 20,
2011, 5:29 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/18/are-french-women-
more-tolerant/feminism-a-foreign-import.
59. Id.
60. Eric Fassin, L'apris-DSK: pour une siduction fiministe, LE MONDE (June 29,
2011, 1:56 PM), http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2011/06/29/1-apres-dsk-pour-une-
seduction-feministe_1542181_3232.html.
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rights.61 His support for this provision, the burqa ban in general, and
the soon-to-come CBQ, would garner support from some feminists as
proof of his sincere commitment to women.62 His burqa ban, derided
at first as "inelegant," passed in 2010.63 The marriage of the fights
against Islamic fundamentalism and for women's rights was
consummated.
Designer Hussein Chalayan exposed a logical fallacy in Cop6's
argument that burqas remove sexual agency. Chalayan's 1998 spring
collection, which became a highlight of his 2011 solo exposition at
the Mus6e des Arts D6coratifs, illustrated the complex meaning of
veiling and voyeurism, and the power/vulnerability in both nudity and
being entirely covered.
The collection continues to challenge both traditional Muslim
mores against exposure and twenty-first-century French tendencies
toward it.64 Chalayan's work foreshadowed how subsequent anti-
61. Article 1 of France's Constitution was amended in 2008 to include a provision
noting that the law would promote women and men having equal access to elected positions
and professional responsibilities. Loi 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des
institutions de la Ve R~publique [Constitutional Act 2008-724 of July 23, 2008 on the
modernization of institutions of the Fifth Republic], J.O., June 24, 2008, p. 11,890. Cope
voted in favor of the amendment. See Sdance du 21/07/2008: Scrutin public sur leprojet de
loi constitutionnelle de modernisation des institutions de la Ve Republique, ASSEMBLEE
NAT'L, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/scrutins/jo900l.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2017)
(listing who voted for the amendment).
62. In 2012, during the battle between Frangois Fillon (France's conservative
Presidential candidate in the 2017 election) and Jean-Frangois Cop6 for the presidency of the
party (UMP), Michale Tabarot, a female member of the National Assembly, published an op-
ed (signed by numerous right-wing politicians and activists) explaining her support for Jean-
Frangois Cop6. Her main argument was that Cop6's "actions in favor of women" were rooted
in the Parity law and the CBQ. She also listed the burqa ban before concluding that she
supported Cop6 for "his sincere commitment in favor of women" considering, de facto, the
burqa ban as being a law in favor of women. Michale Tabarot, Pourquoi nous votons pour
Jean-Frangois Cops, LE FIGARO (Sept. 30, 2012, 11:59 PM), http://www.lefigaro.fr/
mon-figaro/2012/09/30/10001-20120930ARTFIG00163-pourquoi-nous-votons-pour-jean-
francois-cope.php.
63. Cop6, supra note 50.
64. At the time, the New York Times said: "Hussein Chalayan proved he possessed
such power with his spring 1998 collection in England last season, a provocative exploration
of Islamic women's place in society using the chador as the fulcrum." Constance C.R. white,
Hussein Chalayan's High-Wire Act, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/
1998/04/21/style/hussein-chalayan-s-high-wire-act.html. The collection has drawn interest
even many years later. See, e.g., Sarah Mower, Hussein Chalayan Sent Fashion into the
Stratosphere with His High-Concept '90s Shows, VOGUE (Sept. 1, 2015, 2:00 AM), http://
www.vogue.com/13297724/hussein-chalayan-alexander-mcqueen-audrey-marnay/ ("[S]ome
girls were naked from the waist down, the last completely nude save for a face covering. Most
definitely no designer could attempt that now, but at the time Chalayan never meant to cause
offense: 'It was about how we define our territory culturally."'); Hussein Chalayan-Burka
(1996), MISANTHROPE (Nov. 1, 2010), http://ilikecatsmorethanpeople.blogspot.com/2010/11/
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burqa activists would use the language of feminism without actually
engaging its ideals.
When opponents appealed the burqa ban to the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR), the Court rejected France's gender
argument for the ban.6 5 The ECHR responded skeptically, in part
because some women embraced the practice, and a ban would hinder
their personal freedom; 66 nonetheless, the Court upheld the ban,
declaring that it was "not expressly based on the religious connotation
of the clothing in question but solely on the fact that it conceals the
face."67 The focus of the ECHR was the effect on participating in or
hiding from civic life.6 8 It warned any state party to the ECHR to
avoid stereotypes that foster intolerance.69
The veil and burqa bans exposed a previously unnoted
paternalism beneath the universalist, republican mantle of the law:
women needed inclusion as women in the polity. Cop6 redeployed
Paritd's logic with the new idea that women who-for ethnic or
religious reasons-did not disappear into French fraternit, were
being degraded, and needed rescue by the Republic.70 Unenumerated
Muslim minorities remained subject to both socio-economic
exclusion and restrictions on their self-expression. These successful
appropriations of originally progressive feminist arguments made
those arguments available for later use by other French national and
nationalist projects.
hussein-chalayan-burka-1996.html. But see Gabriella Pounds, Subverting the Avant-Garde:
Nudity and Inferiority in Hussein Chalayan's Spring/Summer 1998 Collection, COURTAULDIAN
(Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.courtauldian.com/single-post/2016/03/04/Subverting-The-Avant
Garde-Nudity-and-Inferiority-in-Hussein-Chalayan%E2%80%99s-SpringSummer-1998-
Collection (criticizing the show as "a deeply problematic attempt at reconstructing Muslim
women's sartorial choices from a non-Muslim Western male perspective").
65. S.A.S. v. France, 2014-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 341, 370.
The Court takes the view ... that a State Party cannot invoke gender equality in
order to ban a practice that is defended by women-such as the applicant-in the
context of the exercise of the rights enshrined in those provisions, unless it were to
be understood that individuals could be protected on that basis from the exercise of
their own fundamental rights and freedoms.
Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 379.
68. Id. at 380.
69. "[A] State which enters into a legislative process of this kind takes the risk of
contributing to the consolidation of the stereotypes which affect certain categories of the
population and of encouraging the expression of intolerance, when it has a duty, on the
contrary, to promote tolerance." Id. at 379.
70. See Cop6, supra note 51.
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IV. THE CBQ
In 2003, as France implemented Parit6, Norway enacted the
world's first corporate board quota to remedy women's continued
exclusion from corporate sector leadership.71 Immediately after the
2009 ban on burqas, Marie-Jo Zimmermann, of the right-leaning
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), along with Cop6
proposed the CBQ to copy the Norwegian statute's 40% floor for
either sex. The National Assembly passed the law in early 2011.72
Although feminist arguments played a central role, they originated not
from the feminist movement but from the conservative party to force
mixit6 (sex diversity) into the corporate elite.73 Unlike the left-driven
campaign of Parit6, conservatives drove the CBQ. As the veil and
burqa bans demonstrated, these feminist arguments took on their own
momentum without need for any self-identified feminist actor. This
Part tells how France adopted the corporate quota and how its
adoption further entrenched feminist inclusion through co-optation.
A. State Feminism: The Adoption of the CBQ
Following the success of Norway's quota, which saw near-
absolute compliance by 2008, Zimmermann became interested in
legislating corporate inclusion.74 With women representing only 10%
71. Oliver Staley, You Know Those Quotas for Female Board Members in Europe?
They're Working, QUARTZ (May 3, 2016), https://qz.com/674276/you-know-those-quotas-
for-female-board-members-in-europe-they're-working/.
72. Loi 2011-103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative A la repr6sentation 6quilibr6e des
femmes et des hommes au sein des conseils d'administration et de surveillance et A l'6galit6
professionnelle [Law 2011-103 of January 27, 2011 on the balanced representation of women
and men on boards of directors and supervisory boards and professional equality], J.O., Jan.
2 8
, 2011, p. 1680.
73. Mixit is a French term meaning sex diversity, but the "mixing" implies a mixing
of the two sexes. The use of this distinct term reflects a central distinction drawn in the
French context, even as diversity remains central in the United States. While mixit6 refers to
a clear binary of male/female that is widely accepted in France, diversity carries a broader
meaning in the United States.
74. Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, More Than a Woman: Insights into
Corporate Governance After the French Sex Quota, 48 IND. L. REV. 889, 890, 900 n.67
(2015). Women had achieved substantial levels of equality in most other sectors, and feminist
activists such as Mari Teigen began to consider quotas as a way to balance the corporate
sector. See, e.g., AAGOTH STORvIK & MARI TEIGEN, FRIEDRICH EBERT STrrUNG, WOMEN ON
BOARD: THE NORWEGIAN EXPERIENCE 4 (2010). Cultural biases and the binarist allocation of
child rearing to females had left few women in the pool for corporate leaders, especially at
the highest levels. See generally AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEYTY:
CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND DIvERsiTY (2015) (discussing the use of quotas in
addressing diversity of corporate boards).
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of French corporate leadership, Zimmermann agreed with the
Norwegian business argument that including women would add talent
and improve management. She expressed pride in how much the
CBQ would enrich business and ameliorate a system that was a little
too easy going.75
The leaders of the CBQ effort, Zimmermann and Cop6, stand in
marked contrast to the feminists who advanced Paritd. Both are
conservative politicians, and neither will admit wholeheartedly to a
feminist orientation. In 2011, Zimmermann conveyed her hesitant
feminism:
Today, my views on women's issues have greatly evolved. I look
differently at the society, insofar as it does not leave a prominent place
to women. I also appear to systematically claim a better recognition of
women. If it is to be a feminist to claim equality for women, then yes, I
am one of them.76
Zimmermann's reluctant feminism matches Cop6's awkward melange
of paternalism and chivalry packaged as women's rights.
A conversation with a Norwegian minister who warned that the
Germans might legislate first led Zimmermann to fast-track the CBQ
to preserve France's reputation as a European leader.77 Zimmermann
secured the support of Cop6, around whom conservatives had rallied
after his successful use of feminism in the burqa debate. Cop6 saw
protecting and advancing women as an opportunity for his then-rising
political career. He agreed to support the CBQ possibly to burnish his
nascent chivalrous credentials or as a riposte to feminists and those on
the left who opposed the burqa ban.78
To justify the use of an actual quota that overrode French
business leaders required Zimmermann and Cop6 to argue that the
CBQ would prove profitable. Beyond the goal of advancing women,
75. Margaret Maruani & Marion Paoletti, Interview, Marie-Jo Zimmermann, le
devoir de d6ranger, 25 TRAVAIL, GENRE ET socitEts 5, 16-17 (2011); see also Rosenblum &
Roithmayr, supra note 74, at 889-900 (discussing the quota's immediate effect and general
compliance).
76. Maruani & Paoletti, supra note 75, at 12 (author's translation); see also Marie-Jo
Zimmermann et al., Interview, Marie-Jo Zimmermann: un engagement dans l'espace de la
cause des femmes, 17 HIsTOIiRE@PoLITQuE 87 (2012) ("I still do not define myself as a
feminist but others consider me as one, so I guess I must be one of them.") (author's
translation).
77. See S.G. Sebaoui, Marie-Jo Zimmermann: "J'irai encore plus loin ... jusqu'aux
intercommunalitis!," LE REPUBLICAIN LORRAIN (Jan. 17, 2017, 9:00 PM), http://www.
republicain-lorrain.fr/edition-de-metz-ville/2017/01/17/marie-jo-zimmermann-j-irai-encore-
plus-loin-jusqu-aux-intercommunalites.
78. See supra text accompanying note 7.
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Zimmermann and Cop6 repeated the Norwegian business case
argument-that a critical mass of women would deepen the talent
pool with "women's traits," such as risk aversion and methodical
analysis, that would improve profitability.7 9 Without a critical mass,
minority members become token. These paternalist tendencies
toward the private sector echoed Cop6's regulating the "private"
choice of wearing a burqa. Businesses resisted quotas and hoped
voluntary measures would forestall legislation, but Zimmerman
rejected this effort, insisting that a quota would "get things to move";
the legislature soon passed the law.80
The Law 2011-103, entitled "On the balanced representation of
women and men on boards of directors and supervisory boards and
professional equality," 81 required mixiti for some 2000 publicly traded
companies in France. 82 Inspired by Norway's law, the National
Assembly framed the quota as a floor for both sexes, 83 not as a sex-
specific quota.84 The legislation imposed a six-year schedule for
79. Forty percent surpasses the 30% critical mass level, the minimum inclusion
required for a minority to affect a deliberative body. Below one-third representation, the
minority essentially becomes token. ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE
CORPORAnoN 208 (1977).
80. Olivier Auguste, Les grandes entreprises promettent la parit6, LE FIGARO (Apr.
19, 2010, 9:53 PM), http://www.lefigaro.fr/entreprise/2010/04/19/05011-20100419ARTFIG
00680-les-grandes-entreprises-promettent-la-parite-.php. The legislature first adopted a
corporate sex quota in 2006, but the Constitutional Council struck it down, notwithstanding
the constitutional amendment that had enabled the Paritd quota to be enacted, as the Council
considered quotas in the corporate context to be a separate issue from the Pariti quota. In
response to the court's decision, the legislature amended the constitution again in 2008 to
allow quotas to promote women "to positions of professional and social responsibility,"
establishing "the duty to promote gender parity as fundamental constitutional law." Loi 2008-
724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des institutions de la Ve R6publique [Constitutional
Act 2008-724 of July 23, 2008, on the modernization of institutions of the Fifth Republic],
J.O., June 24, 2008, p. 11,890; Julie C. Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From
Public Office to Corporate Boards, 10 INT'L J. CONST. L. 449, 454, 459 (2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
81. Loi 2011-103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative A la repr6sentation 6quilibie des
femmes et des hommes au sein des conseils d'administration et de surveillance et A 1'6galit6
professionnelle [Law 2011-103 of January 27, 2011 on the balanced representation of women
and men on boards of directors and supervisory boards and professional equality], J.O., Jan.
28, 2011, p. 1680.
82. Id.; France Sets Quota for Women on Big Companies'Boards, REUTERS (Jan. 13,
2011, 2:48 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-equality/france-sets-quota-for-
women-on-big-companies-boards-idUSTRE70C5ZA20110113.
83. STORVIK & TEIGEN, supra note 74, at 4.
84. See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] arts. L225-17, L225-69,
L226-4.
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attaining these objectives: a 20% minimum for both sexes by 2014
and 40% by 2017.85
Two contrasts with Parit6 merit our attention. First, Paritd's
failures might have laid the groundwork for the CBQ's harder
remedies, such as the revocation of noncompliant nominations to the
board and the potential freeze of board members' remunerations.86 A
second distinction: the law veered from the ParitM theory of 50% of
candidacies and instead mandated a 40% floor for either sex for board
seats.87
The CBQ's passage immediately effected change.88 Firms of all
sizes sharply increased their levels of women's representation.89 As a
matter of general governance, French law limits individuals to four
board memberships.90 This rule, combined with the scale of France's
economy-the fifth largest in the world-meant that the CBQ created
85. See Vronique Magnier & Darren Rosenblum, Quotas and the Transatlantic
Divergence of Corporate Governance, 34 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 249, 256 (2014). Firms
subject to the requirement included (1) private companies and joint-stock companies issuing
shares and admitted for trading on a regulated market and (2) French corporations that, for
three consecutive fiscal years, employed at least 500 permanent staff members and produced
an annual revenue or balance sheet total of at least 650 million. See C. COM. arts. L225-17,
L225-69, L226-4.
86. See C. coM. arts. L225-17, L225-69, L226-4. The French quota stopped short of
the Norwegian penalty of dissolution for noncompliant firms. Rules Regarding Gender
Balance Within Boards of Public Limited Companies, REGJERINGEN.NO (Dec. 20, 2005),
https://www.regjeringen.no/no/id4/.
87. Loi 2011-103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative A la repr6sentation 6quilibr6e des
femmes et des hommes au sein des conseils d'administration et de surveillance et A l'6galit6
professionnelle [Law 2011-103 of January 27, 2011 on the balanced representation of women
and men on boards of directors and supervisory boards and professional equality], J.O., Jan.
28, 2011, p. 1680.
88. KARIMA BOUAISS & AGNES BRICARD, FEDERATION DES FEMMES
ADMNIsTRATEURS, LES FEMMES ADMINISTRATEURS AU SEIN DES CONSEILS D'ADMINISTRATION
DES SOCIETES DU SBF 120 EN 2013, http://www.federation-femmes-administrateurs.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/les-femmes-administrateurs-au-sein-des-conseils-dadministration-
des-societes-du-sbf-120-en-2013.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
89. Id. By 2013, of the SBF-120 companies, two-thirds of the companies had
between 20% and 40% of women on their boards, 5% exceeded 40% of women on their
boards, and 83% of French women held only one directorship.
90. AFEP & MEDEF, CODE DE GOUVERNEMENT D'ENTREPRISE DES SOCIETES COTEES
no. 18.4, at 16 (2016), https://www.groupe-psa.com/content/uploads/2017/02/Code-de-
gouvemement-dentreprise-des-societes-cotees-novembre-2016.pdf. Smaller companies face
more problems with compliance. Women in top executive positions remain low, at less than
6%. In a 2016 report, the Haut Conseil A 1'Egalit6 entre les Femmes et les Hommes, a
government agency, concluded that large firms would meet the goal but medium companies
will fall short. DANIELLE BOUSQUET ET AL., HAUT CONSEiL A L'tGALITE ENTRE LES FEMMES
ET LES HOMMES [TOWARDS EQUAL ACcESS OF WOMEN AND MEN TO POSITIONS OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROPORTION OF WOMEN ON BOARDS] 5-6 (2016), http://www.
haut-conseil-egalite.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/hcerapport-parite-eco-eng20160209-2.pdf
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an enormous demand for women board members; firms wanted to
secure the most "competent" women for their boards. As a result,
seven of the top ten global firms are French, with high levels of
women's representation on their boards. 91 The efficacy of the CBQ
may derive from conservatives' incorporation of business goals and
the widely held goal of profit rather than from a normative argument
of equality.
Thanks to Pariti, feminism reached through the state into
corporate regulation to grasp a piece of the boardroom. The CBQ's
passage marked a historical moment when feminist ideas of women's
inclusion became such a fundamental part of public norms that
feminists were not needed to make the argument: it was feminist
influence rather than feminist activism. As feminist ideas disappeared
in plain sight with the veil and burqa debates, here they became
intrinsic to the very definition of French democracy. After the CBQ,
related regulations advanced sex equality throughout French elites in
government, education, and other areas of society.
However, as this Essay suggests, the CBQ was not just about the
relationship between feminism and capital but also about how the new
law advanced the norms of the veil and burqa bans. Indeed, reflecting
on the CBQ, Cop6 and Zimmermann each linked the CBQ with
France's colonial past. In a 2011 colloquium in a jewel-like palace on
the Champs-Elys6es, Cop6 remarked that the test of a society's
civilization is in how it treats its women.92 France was highly
civilized, Cop6 seemed to insist-it promotes women to corporate
elites and saves them from "an injury to the dignity of woman," and
ensures their inclusion in the vivre ensemble.93 Rhetoric praising the
CBQ's civilizing effects resurfaced four years later, at a 2015
colloquium at the National Assembly in which Zimmermann praised
Moroccan interest in a corporate board quota, noting that it reflected a
desire to resist integrisme or religious fundamentalism. 94 For her,
Moroccan interest in a CBQ confirmed that women's equality could
civilize people in France or in its former colony.
91. Tara Deronzier, La France est le pays qui compte le plus de femmes dirigeantes,
FOCUSUR (June 13, 2014), http://www.focusur.fr/actualites/2014/06/13/la-france-est-le-pays-
qui-compte-le-de-femmes-dirigeantes.
92. Jean-Frangois Cop6, Introduction at the Association France-Ameriques event: Les
femmes au conseil d'administration: ga change quoi? (Sept. 26, 2011) (author's translation).
93. Id.; Cop6, supra note 50.
94. Marie-Jo Zimmermann, Panel at the French National Assembly Conference
(June 2015). Integrisme references any religious fundamentalism, although in recent years it
has been used solely to reference Muslim extremism.
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B. Feminism Transformed The Corporate Board Quota's Effects
Espousing valeurs rdpublicaines, nonfeminist actors deployed
feminist arguments pioneered in the Pariti effort to advance
exclusions.95 Then with the CBQ, feminism again appears
inclusive-to force mixit6 into the corporate hierarchy. But let us
pause to assess what feminism wrought once it entered the corporate
sector. If Paritd's inclusion meant governance including women, the
CBQ reflected a different kind of feminism: one that advanced some
at the expense of others, which fortified exclusions. This subpart will
describe those who profited and those who paid.
1. Who Profits?
One goal of Norway's CBQ was to balance opportunities for
people without regard to sex by improving women's opportunities.96
CBQs reflect the way in which the private depends on the public-
extending public norms into the private sphere fosters sex equality.97
The sheer number of firms with board positions now reserved for
women will elevate thousands of women to corporate boards.
This expansion created a rapid and immense distributive shift, a
gold rush for women with a stream of new organizations.98 While this
was a far broader network than the tight group that previously held
board positions, it remained one that benefited people of relative
privilege. An "old girls network" grew, as did alumnae networks,
social groups, educational programs, and coaching and executive
95. See, e.g., Le Bars, supra note 52 (former president Nicholas Sarkovsky
describing the burqa as "a sign of enslavement").
96. Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6 BERKELEY
Bus. L.J. 55, 87 (2009).
97. Id.
98. This gold rush had the support of French corporate leadership. The Institut
Frangais des Administrateurs (IFA), along with "the union of bosses"AFEP/MEDEF engaged
fully in the efforts to implement the CBQ. See Ccile Daumas, Davantage de femmes ei la
table des patrons, LmERATIoN (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.liberation.fr/futurs/2010/01/20/
davantage-de-femmes-a-la-table-des-patrons 605353. It created a directory of CAC 40
directors--the CAC 40 being the largest and most actively traded companies listed on
France's stock exchange-with detailed profiles in order to make it easier to hire women.
Wronique Bruneau-Bayard & Dominique Pageaud, Panorama 2010 des pratiques de
gouvernance des bigcaps: Les tendances 2010, ADMINISTRATEUR: LA LETTRE DE L'IFA, Dec.
2010, at 3; CAC 40 Factsheet, EURONExT (Sept. 30, 2017),'https://www.euronext.com/en/
products/indices/FROO03500008-XPAR/market-information. In some sense, this effect may
reflect Frances Olsen's work decades ago on how the intermingling of public norms that give
rise to private goals as parties outside the state take advantage of the regulatory regime. See
Frances E. Olsen, International Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 25
STUD. TRANSNAT'L LEGAL POL'Y 157, 157-59 (1993).
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search firms, all in the effort to identify, train, and place women on
boards.99  The annual "Women's Forum"-a conference devoted to
promoting women's business leadership-now draws thousands of
women.100 But the fact remains that the CBQ necessarily provides an
advantage to elites-often white, bourgeois women-not to broader
groups of women.101
To retain their class power, business elites choose women who
reflect their own existing elite-driven norms.10 2 In addition, to get
these positions, women may "man up": engage in professional
performances that demonstrate their masculinized skill sets to a male-
driven marketplace. 103 Women in the workplace face a double bind as
they need to perform masculinity to appear skilled but must also
99. There are more than 400 women's social networks today in France. Les riseaux
ftminins permettent-ils auxfemmes de rdussir dans l'entreprise?, RESSOURCES HUMAINEs PAR
SIA PARTNERS (Dec. 18, 2013), http://rh.sia-partners.com/les-reseaux-feminins-permettent-ils-
aux-femmes-de-reussir-dans-lentreprise. For examples of social groups, see ADMIISTRATION
MODERNE, http://www.administrationmodeme.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) (created in
1998 as the first interministerial association of women civil servants that fights for sex
equality in the administration); ARBORUS, http://www.arborus.org (last visited Nov. 5, 2017)
(association created by the European observatory of equality that contains various
associations and firms with the goal of helping promote equality in management); FEMMES
3000, http://www.femmes3000.fr (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) (association that strives to
increase women's participation in public life); PROF. WOMEN'S NETWORK, http://www.pwn
global.net/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) (global federation with 3000 members created to
promote women in business firms in Europe and provide networking and training platforms
for professional women).
100. Women's Forum for the Economy & Society Chooses Paris for 2017 Global
Meeting, WOMEN'S F. FOR ECON. & Soc'Y (Aug. 3, 2017), http://www.womens-fonim.com/
news/global-meeting-2017-in-paris. For example, F6d6ration Femmes Administratuers was
created after the Cop&-Zimmermann law to help women to be ready to work in CAC 40
administrations. FtDtRATION FEMMES ADMINISTRATUERS, http://www.federation-femmes-
administrateurs.com/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2017). It is a network in which experienced
women can help non-experienced women in their future careers. This federation regroups
diverse associations like Association Femmes AAA+, which was created in January 2011 to
promote women lawyers in director positions of big companies, but also Administration
Moderne, created in 1998, and Association des Femmes Dipl6m6es d'Expertise Comptable
Administrateur, created after the CBQ law to obtain the goal of 40% women directors in
CAC 40 firms.
101. Anne Sweigart, Women on Board for Change: The Norway Model of Boardroom
Quotas as a Tool for Progress in the United States and Canada, 32 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
81A, 103A (2012).
102. Quotas may prove useful even if the least progressive women attain power
through them-one could argue that they would still advance gender balance more than the
patriarchal leftovers that occupy our corporations and government. Flipping the male/female
binary toward a more balanced power relationship would entail undermining entrenched
subordinations, including those of gender inequality. See MICHEL PINCON & MONIQUE
PINQON-CHARLOT, SOCIOLOGIE DE LA BOURGEOISIE (3d ed. 2005).
103. Darren Rosenblum, Manning Up 2 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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perform femininity to appeal to (most of) the men who may hire
them. Ultimately, thanks to their gender performance-balancing act,
these women may "feminize" the firm somewhat less than feminists
hope.
2. Who Pays?
Quotas designed to foster equality result in real costs to men.10
Absent state intervention, men form an elite that, in a monopolistic
way, would cyclically replace itself with like-minded men. With
quotas, men lose the near-exclusivity of their economic and social
power and their attendant network dominance. The CBQ institutes a
temporary glass ceiling for men, in place until the boards actually
have 40% women. The ceiling means that most, if not all, new
members for a period of time will be women; thereby ensuring that
the few remaining "male" slots become more competitive. Many
qualified men suffer real loss, especially those whose advanced career
status renders their experience less transferrable.105
By definition, quotas essentialize sex. That sex difference, the
essentialist binary, will determine who gets board positions. Gender
equality remedies require that individuals-board members, political
candidates, or students-fit into the male/female binary. The binary
excludes persons of other sexes and genders, who then fall into a
precarious uncertainty.106 Given the performativity demands of elite
positions, the hurdles for gender nonconforming individuals to rise to
the top are largely insurmountable.
104. Scholars have begun to label the way in which men have dominated political and
corporate elites as men's overrepresentation. Increasing women's political and corporate
representation reduces male advantages in leadership. If men no longer benefit from an
extensive advantage in leadership competition, it would prove quotas' efficacy. See Elin
BjarnegArd & Rainbow Murray, The Causes and Consequences of Male Over-
Representation: A Research Agenda 6 (Apr. 2, 2015), https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/
88304081-30f9-4fe6-902a-d2323f3b37c9.pdf.
105. Some economists argued that men supported Parite because they believed it
increased their incumbency power and dominance. Guillaume R. Fr6chette et al.,
Incumbents' Interests and Gender Quotas, 52 Am. J. POL. Sci. 891, 892 (2008). Even if that
study's assertion faced criticism, it exposes the political complexity around Parite.
106. People may transition from one sex to another or occupy a middle ground as a
third sex or intersex people. They may also change from one gender to another, with or
without medical assistance, without the purpose of "passing" as the other gender. Categories
such as drag queens and drag kings involve people who play around with gender identity and
may not fall into such easy categorization. See generally KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER
OUTLAw: ON MEN, WOMEN AND THE REST OF Us 65-69 (1994) (discussing the fluidity of
gender and sex).
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Such costs may, however, hold benefits for individuals and
society. Two benefits surface with regard to the loss of this monopoly
on power: First, men may improve their skills to match demand, as do
firms that compete harder after they lose monopoly power. Given
what we know about diversity, firms may benefit even if men
privately view this change as a personal cost. Second, sex equality in
elite work may facilitate gender balance in family contexts.10 7 For
heterosexual couples, women's success may facilitate men's engaging
in family work. 08
Quotas may also undermine the sex binary by rebalancing the
profile of typical corporate leaders to include women and reducing
opportunity differentials based on sex. Including women in corporate
leadership will reduce income and, eventually, disparities in care
work. Forty percent acts as a floor that might ultimately impose a
minimum number of men to serve on the board.1 09 The CBQ's 40%
floor instead of Paritd's 50% requirement may shift this binarist
emphasis. Because of this possibility, the CBQ may carry slightly
fewer essentialist effects than Parite.
After the success of Pariti and the CBQ, conservatives managed
to reimagine the status of women as a national priority that--contrary
to feminists' original goals-provided cover to institute paternalist
protections against so-called backward practices such as traditional
Muslim dress.110
V. FEMINISM AND BURKINIS
With Parit6 and the CBQ, France's now-feminist valeurs
rdpublicaines mandated inclusion; however, the veil and burqa bans,
and later attempts to ban burkinis, legislated exclusion by arguing that
burkinis enslaved women.111 In the years since the burqa ban and the
107. See Darren Rosenblum, Loving Gender Balance: Reframing Identity-Based
Inequality Remedies, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2873, 2879-80 (2008).
108. Sex neutral parental leave laws, as I have argued, affect men and women
differently, particularly where women hold family responsibilities and men face stigma for
taking leave. Here we can note that some Scandinavian leave laws incentivize both parents
within a family structure to take parental leave. Country Profiles: Sweden, EuR. CoMM'N:
EMP., Soc. AFF. & INCLUSION, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catld=1248&langld-en&
intPageld=3658 (last visited Nov. 5, 2017). Families where both parents take leave receive, in
aggregate, more time. Given heterosexual dominance, this incentivizes men to take leave.
109. As women come to dominate higher education perhaps reaching as high as two-
thirds, quotas may eventually protect men. See Rosenblum, supra note 107, at 2873.
110. Cop6, supra note 50.
111. See, e.g., Fr&dric Cheutin et al., Valls sur le Burkini: "Une vision archayque de la
place de la femme dans l'espace public," LA PROVENCE (Aug. 17, 2016, 6:55 AM), http://
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CBQ, 2011-2016, France suffered several terrorist attacks, increasing
franco-frangais' collective fear of Muslims.112 This fear echoed the
veil debate of the 1990s that a permissive attitude might lead to an
Islamic state. Burkini bans in France began as early as 2009,
spreading slowly.113 In 2015-2016, the wildly popular novel La
Soumission by Michel Houellebecq gripped France with its dystopic
fantasy. The novel imagines that a moderate Islamist party would take
over France with the support of the left and would then Islamize
France.114 The 2016 Bastille Day attack confirmed and intensified
this fear. Reaction to the attack included panicked arguments that
burkinis threatened public order.115
The 2014 ban in Wissous, a city near Paris, provides an example:
for their seasonal outdoor swimming pool and beach, the rules
forbade wearing "ostentatious religious signs susceptible to create
public order disruption."16 The penalties for ignoring the ban were
relatively minor.17 Despite the veil ban's use of non-Muslim-specific
language, a court struck down the rule.118 Nevertheless, more than
thirty towns banned burkinis on their beaches, even though one mayor
had never seen one.1 19
www.laprovence.com/article/politique/4078328/valls-sur-le-burkini-une-vision-archaique-de-
la-place-de-la-femme-dans-lespace-public.html.
112. Timeline: Attacks in France, BBC NEWS (July 26, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-33288542.
113. Angelique Chrisafis, French Woman Threatens Legal Action over 'Burkini' Ban,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2009, 10:48 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/12/
burkini-ban-islam-france.
114. MICHEL HOUELLEBECQ, SouMissIoN (2015).
115. Erin Mundahl, The Debate over the Burkini Rages on in France, WKLY.
STANDARD (Aug. 18, 2016, 2:35 PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-debate-over-the-
burkini-rages-on-in-france/article/2003889.
116. Faiza Zerouala, Le riglement controverse de Wissous-Plage a nouveau suspendu
par la justice, LE MONDE (Aug. 12, 2014, 6:41 PM), http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/
2014/08/1 2 /le-reglement-controverse-de-wissous-plage-a-nouveau-suspendu-par-la-justice
4470635_3224.html (author's translation) (referencing specific examples such as the burqa
or a patently oversized cross or star).
117. Penalties and enforcement for wearing a burkini vary widely. See, e.g., id.; Allain
Auffray & Laure Equy, Le burkini interdit dans une quinzaine de communes, LIBERATION
(Aug. 19, 2016, 6:41 PM), http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/08/19/le-burkini-interdit-dans-
une-quinzaine-de-communes 1473469. One interviewee from the Collective Against
Islamophobia in France explained that "Islamophobia is very emotional, there's not only a
religious element, there is a sexist element and a racist element and with the burkini there's a
real need to control women's bodies." Alissa J. Rubin, Fighting for the 'Soul ofFrance, 'More
Towns Ban a Bathing Suit: The Burkini, N.Y TIMES (Aug. 17, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2bjAdNK.
118. Zerouala, supra note 116.
119. Angelique Chrisafis, French Mayors Refise To Lift Burkini Ban Despite Court
Ruling, GUARDIAN (Aug. 28, 2016, 1:14 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/
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Politicians repurposed the successful feminist arguments from
the burqa debate for the burkini-focusing on ensuring women's
freedom from religiously forced modesty. 120 As with CBQs and
Paritd, politicians from both the left and right supported bans on
Muslim women's clothes. Leaders of various political persuasions
appropriated feminist language to advance exclusions for Muslims in
the name of protecting women's ability to participate in French
society.
In the burkini debate, feminist arguments bolstered restrictions
on those issus de l'immigration, just as the burqa ban vivre-ensemble
arguments had favored franco-frangais gender performance. Women
who found agency in public life and embraced their female allure fit
the franco-frangais model, while Muslim women who might prefer
modesty would not.121 One sociologist argued that wearing a burkini
was "a visible sign of identitarian aggressivity." 22 Then-Prime
Minister Manuel Valls, a Socialist and regular supporter of feminist
causes, vocally supported the ban, stating that burkinis were akin to
slavery and violated what he views as French values.12 3 Against this
"provocation, the nation must defend itself." 24 While Valls himself
opposes strict enforcement, his feminist support for the ban draws on
an exclusionary concept of women: "The burkini is not a new type of
bathing attire, a trend. It is the translation of a political project, a
counter-society, based on the enslavement of women." 2 5
Laurence Rossignol, the feminist Socialist minister for families,
children, and women's rights, echoed Cop6's civilization language.
She described the burkini as being "profoundly archaic .... [T]he
burkini is . . . a particular vision of the place of the woman. It cannot
28/french-mayors-burkini-ban-court-ruling; Le maire du Touquet n'a jamais vu un burkini,
mais il l'interdit, L'ExPREss (Aug. 16, 2016, 12:28 PM), http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/
societe/le-maire-du-touquet-n-a-jamais-vu-un-burkini-mais-il-1-interdit_1821707.html.
120. See, e.g., Europe 1, supra note 31 (describing the burkini as "profoundly archaic"
and "a particular vision of the place of the woman").
121. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
122. Mathieu Bock-Ct6, Burkini: derridre la laicit, la nation, LE FIGARO: Vox (Aug.
18, 2016, 4:20 PM), http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/2016/08/18/31001-20160818ARTFI
GOO I85-condamner-le-burkini-pour-sauver-la-nation.php (author's translation).
123. Cheutin et al., supra note 111; Angelique Chrisafis, French PM Supports Local
Bans on Burkinis, GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2016, 7:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/aug/i 7/french-pm-supports-local-bans-burkinis.
124. Chrisafis, supra note 123.
125. Cheutin et al., supra note 111. However, Manuel Valls doesn't support a national
ban. In the same interview, he also talks about the lack of enforcement of the ban on burqas. Id.
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be considered only as a question of fashion or individual liberty."26
Amusingly, Rossignol extended her fashion commentary to criticize
H&M and Dolce & Gabanna for their "chaste clothes."27 Noted
feminist Elizabeth Badinter-reprising her role in the veil debate-
joined in with her own criticism of these clothes; both she and
Rossignol view excessive modesty as anti-feminist.128
Ostensible bases for such bans included good moral standards
(bonnes mwurs), laicitd, hygiene, and even safety, under the contrived
theory that burkini-clad women would be harder to rescue.129 Political
discourse about burkinis seems to center on the belief that the wearing
of more revealing bathing suits is a woman's civic duty in order to
engage in the vivre ensemble. Additionally, as the ECHR had foreseen
in the burqa case, fear of terrorism played an explicit role in burkini
legislation. A Cannes ordinance says: "Beach attire that ostentatiously
displays a religious affiliation, while France and places of worship are
the target of terrorist acts, is likely to create risks to public order."l30 A
local judge concurred that burkinis "would exacerbate tensions
between beachgoers of all faiths ... and present a risk to the public
order."31
Despite, or perhaps because of, their political and practical
bases, local burkini bans did not survive national judicial review.132
126. Europe 1,supra note 31.
127. Lucile Quillet, Laurence Rossignol sur la mode islamique: "Les marques font la
promotion de l'enfermement du corps des femmes," LE FIGARO: MADAME (Mar. 30, 2016),
http://madame.lefigaro.fr/societe/laurence-rossignol-indigne-mode-islamique-marques-musul
manes-rmc-300316-113612.
128. Alice Pfeiffer, La mode hisse les voiles, M, LE MAGAZINE DU MONDE (May 2,
2016, 10:40 AM), http://www.lemonde.fr/m-styles/article/2016/05/02/la-mode-hisse-les-
voiles_4911939_4497319.html.
129. Fasquelle justifie son arritd anti-burkini en voquant des "risques de noyade,"
L'EXPRESS (Aug. 27, 2016, 6:53 PM), http://www.1express.fr/actualite/monde/fasquelle-
justifie-son-arrete-anti-burkini-en-evoquant-des-risques-de-noyade1824881.html; see also
Aurelien Breeden & Lilia Blaise, Cannes, Citing Security Risks, Bans Full-Body 'Burkinis'
from Its Beaches, N.Y TIMEs (Aug. 12, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2b38yR4 (translating Arrt6
municipal 16/2754 du 28 juillet 2016 du maire de Cannes [Decree 16/2754 of July 28, 2016
of the Mayor of Cannes]).
130. Arrit6 municipal 16/2754 du 28 juillet 2016 du maire de Cannes [Decree
16/2754 of July 28, 2016 of the Mayor of Cannes]; Breeden & Blaise, supra note 129.
131. Tribunal administratif [TA] [Administrative Court] Nice, Aug. 13, 2016,
1603470, M. Lemaitre.
132. The Conseil d'ttat explained that public authorities' main role is to guarantee
individual liberties. The only exception is if, and only if, public order cannot be guaranteed
(e.g., by more police forces). Conseil d'ttat [CE] [Council of State], May 19, 1933, 17413,
Rec. Lebon 541. Such bans faced legal challenges because localities passed them without
any national action. Thomas Hochmann, L'interdiction du "burkini" est unefautejuridique et
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The Conseil d'tat overturned the bans after the controversy reached
a head over the course of the summer of 2016.133 In late August, the
Conseil stated that the localities should first maintain order then
balance any bans with the value of access to the beach. 134 Focusing
on the Villeneuve-Loubet rule, from a town near Nice where the
Bastille Day terror attack occurred, the judge found no basis for a
threat to public order.135 The heightened emotion and anxiety
resulting from the Nice terrorist attack did not justify the ban. The
judge's decision focused on the personal liberty involved in one's own
choice of clothing. 136 As Stephanie Hennette Vauchez argued prior to
the decision of the Conseil d'tat, burkini laws restricted liberty and
constituted discrimination against MuslimS.1 37 The decision now
stands and is unlikely to be overturned unless by national legislative
action or constitutional reform.
Immediately after the burkini decision, Gaspard reiterated her
pluralist feminism to agree with the Conseil d'Itat's decision.138 Had
ban supporters reacted negatively to the decision, they may have
sought national legislation to override it.139 Banning the burkini
would lead to its proliferation, Gaspard argued, and the ban would be
politique, LE MONDE (Aug. 19, 2016, 6:44 AM), http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/
08/19/1-interdiction-du-burkini-est-une-faute-juridique-et-politique-49847 6 1 _3232.html.
133. CE, Aug. 26, 2016, 402742. The Conseil d'ttat first analyzed the competence of
the mayors issuing public orders, noting that mayors have to balance maintaining public order
and respecting individual freedoms. Id. The court said that any restriction of beach access
must be necessary, proportionate, adapted, and taken for one of the following reasons: proper
access to the shore, swimming safety, hygiene, or decency. Id. Mayors cannot base their
decision on accounts other than known (or proven) risks to public order. Id. The court said
the local ordinance of Villeneuve-Loubet described no risk of public disorder coming from
people wearing certain types of bathing attires and emphasized that the emotion and anxiety
arising from the Nice terrorist attack were not enough to legally justify the ban. Id. The court
held, therefore, that the mayor of Villeneuve-Loubet acted beyond his powers. Id. The court
also described the local ordinance as presenting a serious and obvious violation of
fundamental freedoms, notably the freedom of movement and the freedom of conscience. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. St6phanie Vauchez, Le burkini de l'dtat d'urgence, LIBERATION: Do You LAW?
(Aug. 23, 2016), http://doyoulaw.blogs.liberation.fr/2016/08/23/et-le-burkini-devint-debat-
national/.
138. Julia Mariton, "Ligiferer pour interdire c'est simplementprendre le risque que les
foulards revendicatifs se multiplient, " LA NOUVELLE REPUBLIQUE (Sept. 5, 2016, 12:00 PM),
http://www.lanouvellerepublique.fr/France-Monde/Actualite/Politique/n/Contenus/Articles/
2016/09/04/Legiferer-pour-interdire-c-est-simplement-prendre-le-risque-que-les-foulards-
revendicatifs-se-multiplient-2824144.
139. Id.
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liberticide.140 While the Conseil d'tat's reason prevailed over 2016's
fearmongering, the debate exposed the other side of the CBQ's
inclusion: here, predominant feminist arguments again advanced
exclusion.
VI. THE 2017 ELECTIONS: A TURN TO LIBERAL INCLUSIVITY?
Although popular, the reversal of burkini bans presaged another
centrist shift-the presidential and legislative elections of 2017.
Emmanuel Macron swept both elections with his new party, La
R~publique en Marche.141 Their forward-looking image of France
was more inclusive than traditional parties. As a result, of the 577
members of the National Assembly, approximately twenty legislators
come from a background issu de l'immigration, although the press did
not ascribe any religious affiliation to these leaders, following the
state's prohibition of reporting religious identity.142 One news source
proclaimed, "The National Assembly is finally in the image of the
country."1 43  Of these representatives, four women are of North
African heritage-Sarah El Hairy, Fadila Khattabi, Anissa Khedher,
and Sonia Krimi-and none of them wear a headscarf.14 One woman
deputy, Ramlati Ali, represents Mayotte, a small island off
Madagascar, which voted to become a Ddpartement of France in
2011.145 She wears a headscarf but insists it is not a Muslim veil but
instead a chdle Mahorais.146
Macron's views of the relationship between the state and religion
are more liberal than those of Walls and Sarkozy. Macron, in separate
statements, agreed with the veil ban for impressionable school-aged
girls but disagreed with bans for adult women-in the workplace or
140. Id.
141. Alissa J. Rubin et al., Emmanuel Macron's Party and Allies Win Big in France,
N.Y. TIMEs (June 18, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2tACkpj.
142. Guillaume Descours, La diversit progresse i l'Assemblde nationale, LE FIGARO
(June 20, 2017, 12:40 AM), http://www.lefigaro.fr/elections/legislatives/2017/06/20/38001-
20170620ARTFIG00139-la-diversite-progresse-a-l-assemblee-nationale.php.
143. Jean-Marie Pottier, L'Assemble nationale est enfin a l'image du pays, SLATE
(Fr.)(June 19, 2017, 11:19 AM), http://www.slate.fr/story/147171/deputes-diversite.
144. Descours, supra note 142.
145. Marina Mielczarek, Mayotte devient le 1012me ddpartementfrangais, RFI (Mar.
31, 2011, 4:07 PM), http://www.rfi.fr/france/20110331-mayotte-devient-le-10leme-departe
ment-francais.
146. Mme. Ali vigorously insisted that her veil is a local custom of Mayotte and not a
Muslim one. Lalere.fr (@lalere), TWITTER (July 3, 2017, 12:25 PM), https://twitter.com/
lalere/status/881957147113918465.
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the university-as restricting the liberty of such women.147 Bans
would relegate women to life within their communities when laciti
stands against communitarisme. Macron argued that the French rule
is latciti not laicisme-a belief in a civic religion. 148
Macron's victory and that of his party repudiated the existing
political order. But we cannot presume that he will reverse the
paternalist tide carried so far in part by feminist rhetoric. The bans'
continued success poses questions for feminisms that take hold, even
tenuously, of the state's reins.
VII. CONCLUSION
Feminists pursued inclusion in the Republic with Paritd and they
succeeded in convincing France to enshrine their essentialist norms.
Once it became a valeur rdpublicaine, feminism changed. It went
from a 1990s outsider perspective to a central tenet of the twenty-first
century, demonstrated by fluid feminist arguments by male leaders of
both left (Socialist) and right (UMP) parties. Despite Paritd's limited
success in actually fixing sex ratios in elected officialdom, the
perseverance of male dominance in politics-combined with
widespread use of feminist language-makes some of this feminism
look more like old-school chivalry. France included women in
economic leadership with the CBQ and reduced "enslavement" by
restricting Muslim women's clothing, including veils, burqas, and,
briefly, burkinis. Quotas legitimize certain identity differences to the
exclusion of others. The linkage of feminism and the valeurs
rdpublicaines within universalism transformed French law, as it
juxtaposed inclusive remedies (Pariti and the CBQ) for sex difference
against exclusionary ones (veil, burqa, and burkini bans) related to
religion and ethnicity.149 This transformation of feminism within the
state poses genuine conflicts for feminist advocacy.
147. Replay du 4fjvrier 2017 a Lyon, EN MARCHE! (Feb. 4, 2017), https://en-marche.
fr/article/meeting-macron-lyon-video. See also Ludovic Galtier, Revivez l'intervention
d'Emmanuel Macmn dans "RIL Matin," RTL: PRESIDENTIELLE 2017 (Oct. 4, 2016, 4:24
PM), http://www.rtl.fr/actu/politique/emmanuel-macron-est-1-invite-de-rtl-mercredi-5-octobre-
et-repondra-a-vos-questions-7785111162, an episode in the radio program RTL Matin.
148. Bruno Roger-Petit, Thdorie du genre et laicitd: plut6t Macron que Valls contre le
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149. Inclusion of sex difference supports arguments of democratic legitimacy. Julie
Suk emphasizes the central role played by the corporatist tradition in the passage of the law in
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